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Considering Lakoff’s Anti-Objectivist Stance, the last Performative Truth Post, and Truth in General

Rereading some transcendental literature, a book called Essay on Transcendental Philosophy by Salmon Maimon, I remembered a major point of objectivist metaphysics.

The definitions of truth as they see them are based on the truth and falsity of a proposition, yes, but they are also coming from a fundamental conception of truth.

This conception of truth reads more stupidly like, “a string of symbols represents the truth of the world,” and less stupidly reads something like, “only a faithful relationship between words and the world can be true or false.”

So the stupid conception gets us in hot water because we forget about the world entirely.  The smart conception flies because we are able to name truth and then communicate it.

Why the embodied truth model, if the objectivist model holds up in our smart conception?  The embodied truth model operates with the fundamental nearness to the world, whatever that may be.  The foundational declaration truth is not words hopefully keeps us away from the stupid conception, yet above the smart conception.

Words are not true (stupid objectivist conception), and really truth isn’t even dependent on the relationship between words and the world (smart objectivist conception); and really words aren’t the big deal when it comes to truth at all, at all.